This is a war story with details of violence. It is not suitable for young children.
"The heroic American stand at the towns of Krinkelt and Rocherath slowed
the German advance in the Battle of the Bulge.
The little road junction of Wahlerscheid was a veritable German fortress. Large
concrete bunkers and log-covered pillboxes dotted the landscape, while the
forest trails and roads bristled with mines and machine-gun nests. Barricades of
barbed wire, piled high and 8 to 10 feet deep, covered all avenues of approach.
Out in front of the bunkers, fields of fire had been cleared to provide yet
another advantage to the defenders, while the thick trees and dense undergrowth
further stymied attackers.
For 2 1/2 days the Americans had been stopped in their tracks, but by 0600 on
December 16, 1944, the Americans' hold on the crossroads was complete, the
mopping up finished. Evidence of the effort expended to capture Wahlerscheid was
plain to see--shattered tree trunks stood starkly against the snow-covered
ground, and branches littered the forest floor. Large, deep holes made by every
type of shell were evident in great numbers. Telephone wire and other
communications cables were strung out crazily. Ammunition boxes, empty
bandoleers and clips lay all over the torn ground. Then there were the men,
tired and disheveled. Some walked around poking through the debris. Others stood
smoking cigarettes, silent. Still others, laid out in neat, straight rows, did
nothing. The battle for Wahlerscheid was over, but soon the Battle of the Bulge
would unfold, and the survivors would call it "Heartbreak Crossroads."
Located inside Germany, across the German/Belgian border, the road junction of
Wahlerscheid was a key piece of the puzzle. The Roer River dams, long a major
source of irritation to Allied planners, had to be captured before an advance
across the wide, flat Roer Plain could be attempted. Once taken, Wahlerscheid
would provide not only decent roads but also a good axis of attack toward the
dams, which lay just a few miles to the northeast.
While the newly formed 78th Infantry Division attacked German positions farther
north along the German border between Lammersdorf and Monschau, the task of
capturing Wahlerscheid fell to the 2nd Infantry Division, a seasoned outfit that
had recently been pulled out of the line farther south. Assembled near the town
of Elsenborn the first week of December, two of the 2nd Division's three
infantry regiments, the 9th and the 38th (the third, the 23rd Infantry, was held
in reserve near Elsenborn), were trucked to B�llingen, then north to Rocherath
and Krinkelt, two villages so close together they had been nicknamed the "Twin
Villages." From there, the two regiments marched north for six miles along the
only road to Wahlerscheid. This single road, the main avenue of approach, was
the only route by which supplies and reinforcements could be funneled to the
forward regiments from divisional headquarters at Wirtzfeld.
For two days the Germans fought with grim determination, until several members
of a lone U.S. patrol cut their way undetected through one barricade after
another until they were in the bunker line. They later slipped back to report
the breach, and late on December 15, first a company, then a battalion, and then
another battalion had slipped through the opening in the wire. By early the next
morning, the fight for Wahlerscheid was over.
A couple miles east of and parallel to the 2nd Division's line of march, through
a dense forest belt, lay the front lines of the green 99th Infantry Division. On
the Continent for just over a month, the 99th held a line from Monschau,
northwest of Wahlerscheid, to the border village of Lanzerath, southeast of the
Elsenborn Ridge, a distance of nearly 19 miles. Except for the area around
H�fen, a village located southeast of Monschau, the 99th's front lay inside a
thick, coniferous forest. During the first week of December, the forward rifle
companies, rather than presenting a solid line, were positioned just inside the
forest and parceled out in platoon-sized outposts along the entire line, thus
leaving numerous undefended gaps. The longest section of the line ran parallel
to a major road, dubbed the International Highway, from a point just west of
Hollerath, Germany, south to the frontier village of Losheimergraben.
Intersecting the front were two trails that led from the highway west, back
through the forest, where they converged about 1 1/2 miles northeast of the Twin
Villages. The northernmost trail left the highway just west of Hollerath in an
area covered by the 393rd Infantry Regiment. The southern trail entered the
forest west of Neuhof, also in Germany, at a point just north of where the lines
of the 393rd and 394th Infantry regiments met.
To support the 2nd Division's attack at Wahlerscheid and to draw away enemy
troops, the 395th Regimental Combat Team (RCT), composed of two battalions of
the 395th Infantry Regiment and one from the 393rd, had initiated an attack on
December 13 against German positions about 1 1/2 miles southeast of
Wahlerscheid. Progressing smoothly at first, the diversion began to bog down as
German resistance stiffened on December 14. Terrible weather soon brought it to
a complete standstill.
First Army and V Corps Intelligence believed that a German counterattack would
probably occur along the 99th Division's front. For this reason, when an awesome
artillery bombardment rolled over the 99th's front to the south of Wahlerscheid
beginning at about 0530 hours on December 16, commanders up and down the line
thought the Germans were merely responding to the breakthrough at Wahlerscheid.
To the southeast, along the International Highway, the 99th's two southernmost
regiments were shelled. A major in the 12th Volksgrenadier Division remembered,
"We old soldiers had seen many a heavy barrage, but never before anything like
this." The intensity and duration of the shelling came as a surprise to some of
the GIs, as Army Intelligence had previously reported that the Germans had only
two horse-drawn artillery pieces in the entire sector. Up front, at a forward
battalion command post (CP), one of the 99th's staff officers quipped,
"They sure are working those two poor horses to death." The GIs had prepared
their positions well, however. Deep, log-covered dugouts and foxholes provided
good cover, and casualties from the shelling were notably light.
As the shelling stopped or moved on to the rear at about 0635 on the 16th,
German troops charged. In the north near H�fen the initial ground assault
against a battalion of the 395th Infantry Regiment was so intense that on at
least three occasions the bodies of Germans shot at point-blank range fell into
the foxholes on top of the defending GIs.
Along the International Highway where the 393rd was positioned, large numbers of
German infantry from the 12th Volksgrenadier Division followed closely on the
heels of the barrage. Sweeping from behind the bunkers of the West Wall (also
known as the Siegfried Line), they streamed up the slopes, dashed west across
the road and hit the 3rd Battalion especially hard. As one GI put it, "It seemed
like they were coming right at us and for some reason ignoring everybody else."
One company, positioned where the northernmost forest trail joined the highway,
was nearly wiped out--only one platoon escaped.
When notified of the situation near the highway, the battalion commander ordered
the remaining companies to fall back on the battalion CP, to prevent it from
being overrun. Meanwhile, scores of Germans pushed on down the trail and by dusk
had reached the Jansbach Creek, nearly halfway through the forest. During the
late afternoon, Maj. Gen. Walter Lauer, the 99th Division commander, ordered a
company from the division reserve rushed to the 3rd Battalion's assistance. That
company fought its way east along firebreaks running parallel to the trail until
darkness forced a halt to the fighting. Although the Germans had punched a
sizable dent in the 3rd Battalion's line, they failed to achieve the major
breakthrough needed to clear the way for the tanks of the waiting 12th SS Panzer Division.
Just to the south, the 393rd's 1st Battalion underwent the same punishment.
There, however, most of the foxholes were positioned on the very edge of the
forest with clear fields of fire, and the GIs exacted a greater toll on the
advancing enemy. The first wave of grenadiers broke, then fell back in disarray,
leaving behind a large number of dead and wounded. Shortly afterward, the second
assault achieved several penetrations, forcing one American company to fall back
some 300 yards into the forest. After being reinforced in the afternoon, that
company counterattacked and pushed the Germans back almost to the original line.
By nightfall on December 16, the 393rd's line was for the most part intact,
though holed in several places. German patrols of 50 or more men infiltrated
through the gaps and probed the woods for American defenses.
South of the 393rd's 1st Battalion, the 394th's 2nd Battalion had been hit
shortly after the barrage had lifted early on the 16th. There, the enemy force
was not as strong, roughly equal to what the 2nd Battalion had on the line. The
GIs fought off all attacks, including one in which the Germans used several
self-propelled guns. The 99th's supporting artillery laid on deadly fire that
quickly put an end to attempts to break through.
Likewise, the 394th's 1st and 3rd battalions in and around Losheimergraben had
come under attack from several directions. Both units sat astride roads that had
been designated as primary march routes for the 1st SS Panzer Division,
commanded by SS Oberf�hrer Wilhelm Mohnke. The 1st Battalion's lines crossed the
main road, which branched off the International Highway at Losheimergraben and
then wound westward through B�llingen and Malmedy. The 3rd Battalion, which
constituted the division reserve, was in position near Bucholz and the little
rail station there. Its lines stretched across the secondary road that led from
Lanzerath through Bucholz to Honsfeld and eventually Malmedy. Absolutely vital
to the German advance, the two roads had to be captured quickly by German
infantry, for just behind the foot troops several hundred tanks, halftracks and
armored cars waited. Once the Losheimergraben crossroads was taken, the pent-up
force of SS Colonel Joachim "Jochen" Peiper's armored battle group (Kampfgruppe)
of the 1st SS Panzer Division would rush through the breach and dash headlong
for the Meuse River and beyond. The division's ultimate objective was Antwerp.
Not long after the artillery barrage ended, German infantry at Losheim advanced
toward Bucholz along the deep cut of the rail line. At about the same time, two
other battalions of enemy infantry fought their way up to and then across the
International Highway just northeast of the crossroads and forced a gap between
two companies of GIs. Only the superb actions of the attached mortar platoons
saved the tenuous American toehold.
As the attack from the northeast progressed, more Germans probed, then struck
from the other side of the crossroads. The pressure against the 1st Battalion
mounted on both sides of Losheimergraben, but with help from the 3rd Battalion
the crossroads remained in American hands. However, the reinforcement of the
crossroads left the American positions in and around Bucholz dangerously thin.
In the little hamlet of Lanzerath, just south of Bucholz, the 394th's
Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R;) Platoon had been fighting all morning on
December 16. Charged with maintaining contact with the 99th Division's southern
neighbor, the 14th Cavalry Group, across the two-mile-wide Losheim Gap,
Lieutenant Lyle Bouck and his handful of men had been battling paratroopers of
the German 3rd Fallschirmj�ger (Parachute) Division since before dawn. Shortly
after the artillery barrage ended, strong thrusts against the 14th Cavalry Group
led to its withdrawal, and contact with the I&R; platoon was broken. Members of a
towed tank destroyer outfit in Lanzerath also retreated, leaving the little band
of men to fend for themselves.
Occupying good defensive positions atop a tree-covered hill overlooking
Lanzerath, Bouck and his men had watched in the pre-dawn darkness as a long
column of enemy infantry marched up the road toward Lanzerath. Just slightly
behind the main column, Bouck noticed three men talking as they walked along.
Thinking that they must be the 3rd Parachute Division commander and part of his
staff, Bouck ordered his men to shoot the three. Taking careful aim, the GIs
were about to fire when a little girl ran to the three men and pointed straight
at the American positions. One of the men yelled a command and the paratroopers
dropped into ditches alongside the road. A fierce firefight erupted, but the I&R;
platoon kept the Germans in check all day long. Then, after dark, the Germans
worked around the flanks and overran the determined GIs, killing several and
capturing the rest, including Lieutenant Bouck. At that point it was only the
few men remaining in Bucholz who were keeping the Germans from rolling up the
entire right flank of the 99th Division.
Early on the afternoon of December 16, the 2nd Division's 23rd Infantry Regiment
minus one battalion was attached to the 99th Infantry Division. The 1st
Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. John C. Hightower, was ordered by General Lauer
to move to H�nningen, several miles northwest of Losheimergraben on the main
road to B�llingen. Lauer hoped the move would shore up his flagging southern
flank. Pulling into position late in the afternoon, the 1st Battalion quickly
established defenses south and southeast of H�nningen.
Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, under Lt. Col. Paul Tuttle, moved out to the north
and east of the Twin Villages. Early the following morning, part of the
battalion was to attack east and link up with the remainder of the 393rd's 3rd
Battalion, which was still positioned along the northern forest trail. The rest
of the battalion was to take up positions astride the southern trail to provide
backup for the 393rd's other battalion. However, by the time the 3rd Battalion
arrived it was already growing dark, and little movement actually took place. A
short time later, Tuttle received orders from Maj. Gen. Walter Robinson, 2nd
Division commander, to stay put and establish positions across both trails.
As midnight approached in Lanzerath on December 16, the Kampfgruppe of the 1st
SS Panzer Division drove into the village. The commander, Colonel Peiper, was
furious. After being stalled all day at the rear of a long column, he had
finally received orders to break out to the west any way he could. Pushing the
men and equipment ahead of him off the road, he had finally reached
Lanzerath--several hours later than scheduled. Waiting for the 3rd Parachute
Division to clear a path through the 99th's lines, in addition to traversing
broken terrain and mined roads, had cost him even more time--time that he feared
he might not be able to make up. He was not in the mood for any more delays.
Inside a small cafe, he found the commander of the 9th Parachute Regiment,
Colonel Helmut von Hoffman, and demanded to know why he had not moved farther.
More than a little intimidated by the SS officer, the paratroop colonel
explained that his men had run into stiff resistance and that the woods and road
ahead were packed with American troops and tanks. Peiper asked if any
reconnaissance had been conducted, and, as he had anticipated, the answer was
no. Thoroughly disgusted, Peiper demanded that a battalion of paratroopers
accompany his tanks. He was going ahead. Prisoner Lyle Bouck, lying on the floor
of the cafe, watched as Peiper stormed out.
Around 0400 on December 17, the lead tanks of Kampfgruppe Peiper left Lanzerath
and rolled into Bucholz, completely routing the small American garrison there.
Only one man, a headquarters company radio operator, remained in the town,
hidden in a cellar. He counted the number of tanks as they rolled by and relayed
information to division headquarters until he was captured.
The Germans forged ahead toward Honsfeld. Just short of their destination, they
came upon a stream of American vehicles, all headed west through the little
village. Rather than opening fire, the Germans, in the confusion and pre-dawn
darkness, simply joined the convoy, pulling into line as breaks presented
themselves. Once inside the village proper, the German tanks and infantry riding
them opened fire with telling results. Honsfeld, site of one of the 99th
Division's rest centers, was crowded with men and equipment of all types, and
retreating vehicles clogging the narrow streets added to the congestion. As the
Germans sprayed buildings and vehicles with tank and automatic-weapons fire, GIs
emerged only to be killed or captured. In some instances GI drivers hastily
abandoned their vehicles and fled on foot. In very short order, Peiper had
control of Honsfeld and a supply of something else he desperately
needed- gasoline.
His tanks refueled, Peiper proceeded toward B�llingen, just a few miles away. He
was met by a hastily formed defense consisting of U.S. engineers, headquarters
personnel and a few tank destroyers. Fighting raged in and around the village
throughout the morning, but the sheer weight of numbers on the German side
finally forced the defenders to fall back. By late morning, a last-ditch effort
to block the Butgenbach road took shape. Instead of forcing the issue and
driving north, however, a move that would have most certainly trapped the 2nd
and 99th divisions, Peiper's battle group turned southwest, completely
confounding the Americans. As General Lauer later commented, "The enemy had the
key to success within his hands but did not know it."
By late afternoon on December 16, the 2nd Division commander's feeling of
uneasiness had turned to one of impending disaster. General Robertson had by
then lost his division reserve to the 99th as well as a combat command of the
9th Armored Division, on loan to him to use when the Wahlerscheid breakthrough
was completed. Most of his infantry and two divisional artillery battalions were
well forward, which would make any withdrawal extremely difficult at best
because only a single road led south from Wahlerscheid. Earlier in the day he
had requested permission from the First Army through the V Corps to call off the
Wahlerscheid attack but was turned down. Since no one at First Army headquarters
realized the scope of the German offensive at this stage, there seemed little to
gain and much to lose by pulling back from the Wahlerscheid position. Undaunted,
Robertson personally called the regimental commanders at Wahlerscheid late that
evening and ordered them to hold tight for the night; they were to continue the
attack in the morning, but only upon his express order.
The Germans renewed their attack at Losheimergraben early on December 17. Strong
attacks from both flanks and the front failed to achieve any significant
progress, but the thinly held American line was crumbling rapidly as the
remnants of the 394th's 1st Battalion were reduced to small groups able to offer
little more than token resistance. Compounding the Americans' problems, German
engineers had repaired a bridge along the Losheim-Losheimergraben road, and
shortly before noon German armor made an appearance on the road, crawling slowly
toward the disputed crossroads. As even more enemy infantry joined the fray, the
few remaining GIs pulled back from the woods and took up positions in basements
in the few buildings around a small customs house.
Around 1400, a withdrawal from the Losheimergraben area was authorized. Moving
back through the woods, men of the 1st and 3rd battalions found themselves in
M�rringen, due south of the Twin Villages and just north of H�nningen, where the
lone battalion from the 23rd Infantry still held positions.
During the withdrawal, the 2nd Battalion clashed with a large group of Germans.
With his ammunition dangerously low, the American commander was unwilling to
risk another fight, and he led his troops into the woods southeast of M�rringen
until a clear determination of friendly positions was made.
At H�nningen, Colonel Hightower anticipated a major attack as the Germans moved
past his rear. But what the 1st Battalion commander did not realize was that the
enemy column (Kampfgruppe Peiper) was actually detouring around H�nningen,
interested only in getting back onto its assigned route.
At 1600, the expected attack unfolded, but not from the rear. Heavy shelling
preceded an infantry attack from around Losheimergraben. American artillery
fire, called down by an observer in the church steeple, was highly effective in
stopping the onrushing German troops. But the enemy kept coming, the German
commander sending seven distinct attacking waves during the afternoon and early
evening. Several penetrations of the thin American line were made but at no time
was the enemy able to take H�nningen.
Sometime during the afternoon, Hightower received a radio message removing him
from the 394th and assigning him to the 9th Infantry Division headquartered in
Wirtzfeld. The message, from Colonel Chester Hirschfelder, 9th Infantry
commander, also instructed Hightower to "pull back to new positions or you will
be cut off." By then, however, Hightower's men were so closely engaged with the
Germans that he was not sure if he could break off and move without great
difficulty. Nevertheless, he called Colonel Riley of the 394th and advised him
of the change in plans. Riley was notably upset, for if Hightower's men pulled
out now, his entire right flank would be up in the air, and he still did not
know the whereabouts of his 2nd Battalion. A quick radio exchange with General
Lauer confirmed the order. Riley knew now that he had no alternative--with
ammunition running out and enemy pressure increasing by the minute, he would
also have to pull back. Lauer agreed but insisted that any move would have to be
coordinated with the 23rd Infantry. Riley spoke with Hightower again, and
between them a plan took shape. The withdrawal from H�nningen and M�rringen
would commence soon after midnight.
The men of the 393rd's 3rd Battalion, meanwhile, had counterattacked east along
the northern forest trail early on December 17, in an attempt to regain their
positions along the International Highway. They drove the Germans back off the
trail, but then ran into a reinforced battalion of SS Panzergrenadiers coming
from the opposite direction and soon joined by the 12th SS Panzer Division.
Roving teams of GIs using bazookas managed to hold the panzers at bay for a
short time, but the combination of armor and numerical superiority was too much
for the defenders. The GIs--critically short of just about everything by
then- had to withdraw again.
At 1030, Colonel Jean Scott, 393rd Regiment commander, obtained the OK to
withdraw to a new line east of Rocherath. The 3rd Battalion slowly withdrew
along the trail and firebreaks, eventually passing through the line established
by the 23rd Infantry's 3rd Battalion. As they filed past, the men of the 23rd
Infantry begged for any ammunition the others could spare, since they had been
issued only the basic load, which would not last for long. At that point,
although they did not know it, the few hundred men of the 23rd Infantry's 3rd
Battalion were all that stood in the way of the Germans' cutting off all 2nd and
99th Division troops in the Wahlerscheid sector.
By late morning, the situation in the woods had deteriorated to such an extent
that Colonel Tuttle's orders had been changed to "Hold at all costs." Unsure of
what to expect, Tuttle called his company commanders together and passed the
order to them.
Robertson had realized by daybreak on December 17 that his division and the 99th
were fighting for their very existence. Finally receiving permission to call off
the Wahlerscheid attack, he immediately began to implement the withdrawal that
had been planned during the night. The plan, "skinning the cat" as Robertson
phrased it, called for the most forward units at Wahlerscheid to pull back
first, through those behind them. This included the three battalions of the
395th RCT, which was now attached to the 2nd Division. Robertson's plan
envisioned the RCT pulling back along a trail that ran nearly parallel to the
main road, before joining it about a mile and a half north of Rocherath.
Marching south along that trail, the RCT would provide a cover for the other
battalions coming back south along the main road.
Waiting on the main road, Robertson met the first of the RCT members and
directed the 1st Battalion to positions north of Rocherath, along both sides of
the Wahlerscheid road. The first of his own units, the 38th Infantry's 3rd
Battalion, came into view a short time later. As had previously been arranged,
Colonel Frank Boos, the 38th Infantry commander, had instructed his 3rd
Battalion to proceed south past Krinkelt and establish a line south-southeast of
the village to deny use of the roads in that area to the Germans.
In the early afternoon, the 9th Infantry's 1st Battalion started south down the
main road. The 1st Battalion, commanded by Lt. Col. William D. McKinley (a
grand-nephew of President William McKinley) was last in line. As they headed
south, the men heard the sound of the battle through the falling snow.
East of the road, the battle in the forest reached a critical stage. Just after
the survivors of the 393rd's 3rd Battalion had passed, German tanks and infantry
unleashed a torrent of fire against the 23rd Infantry's roadblock. Company I was
hit especially hard but held its ground until ammunition gave out. Falling back
to a firebreak just a few yards behind their original line, the Americans
attempted to establish another defensive position, but the Germans, sensing
victory, closed too quickly. Two Sherman tanks positioned to back up the 3rd
Battalion dueled with the advancing panzers in a gallant effort, but they were
no match for the Tigers and Panthers and were quickly knocked out.
As they withdrew, the GIs came out onto large stretches of open ground that were
raked by German artillery and rocket fire, adding to the confusion. Many men
became separated from their units and made their way to the rear individually or
were rounded up and captured by the rapidly advancing Germans.
At 1600, Robertson learned that the 393rd's 3rd Battalion had pulled back from
the woods and that his 23rd Infantry's 3rd Battalion had been badly mauled. He
realized that there was now no effective resistance to the east and that the
Twin Villages and the Wahlerscheid road could be captured at any time. Hurrying
back along the road toward Wahlerscheid, he came upon Company K of the 9th
Infantry's 3rd Battalion. He quickly directed the commander to take his men
southeast to Lausdell, a point where several farm roads and trails converged.
That done, he jumped back into his jeep and rushed north toward Wahlerscheid
again. Just up the road he met McKinley's badly depleted 3rd Battalion. Locating
10 trucks, Robertson instructed McKinley to load as many men as possible and
have the rest follow on foot. He then led the convoy to the Lausdell junction.
Once there, he told McKinley to round up and take command of all the troops in
the immediate vicinity, set up a defense around the junction and hold "until
ordered otherwise."
McKinley's force- roughly 600 men- began the tedious but necessary task of
digging in. As they began, survivors from the 23rd Infantry streamed back from
the woods to the east. Seeing the friendly faces, one of the retiring troops
asked which outfit was taking up the Lausdell position. Through gritted teeth
one of the digging men replied: "Ninth Infantry. It ain't enough we attack for
five f--ing days. We gotta turn around and take up somebody else's defense." By
1800, McKinley's positions were fairly well-established, including some mines
and a direct communications line to supporting artillery emplaced around Elsenborn.
At about 1830, one of the forward companies reported that tanks were
approaching. By now it was pitch dark, and positive identification of the armor
was impossible. Forewarned that still more men from the 23rd, 393rd and 394th
might yet come out of the forest, the GIs held their fire, and by the time
anyone realized the tanks were German they had rumbled past the forward outposts
and headed for Rocherath. A short distance behind the front line, two GIs
started on their way to verify the tanks' identity. As they were standing
alongside the road SS Panzergrenadiers walked right past the GIs, not paying
them any attention. Then the tanks came roaring by, and one of the commanders
riding high in a turret gestured rudely at the two men as he passed. As the two
men raced off quickly toward the CP to request artillery support, the Germans
opened fire, killing one of them. The other made it to the CP, and soon mortars
were falling, but just one tank was hit.
Meanwhile, more tanks and infantry appeared at the front. Realizing now that
anything approaching along the road from the forest was German, McKinley's men
were galvanized to action. A string of mines pulled across the road stopped two
of the panzers, while daring bazooka teams accounted for two more. Along another
road still more German armor appeared. Artillery fire took out four of those
tanks, but several others ran the gantlet of fire and continued on to Rocherath.
Just a few minutes later, still more enemy tanks materialized on the main road,
this time accompanied by a large number of infantry. The artillery liaison
officer screamed into his radio handset for fire on the rapidly closing column,
saying, "If you don't get it out now, it'll be too goddamned late!" The response
came a minute later in a deafening crash of exploding shells, and the German
attack withered under the brutal pounding. When the shelling ceased, a silence
described by one man as "almost frightening" fell over the battlefield.
While McKinley's men were digging in, the last American troops left Wahlerscheid
en route to the Twin Villages. Two battalions from the 38th Infantry were
nearing an area called the Baracken Crossroads when German artillery began to
fall on them. The 1st Battalion, under Lt. Col. Frank Mildren, ran through the
deadly fire, with two companies taking heavy casualties. Making his way to
Rocherath, Mildren tried to locate his executive officer. He finally spotted him
near the gray stone church that separated the two villages. Mildren got a quick
briefing, then made his way to the CP, a house just south of the church.
Locating as many of his men as possible, he directed them into positions east
and northeast of Krinkelt, placing one platoon farther out in front of the
others to give the alarm if the Germans broke through. The 2nd Battalion,
meanwhile, filtered into Rocherath to positions east and northeast of that
village, almost directly behind McKinley's positions at Lausdell.
West of Krinkelt, engineers from the 2nd Division worked feverishly to shore up
the single dirt road between the Twin Villages and Wirtzfeld. It was along that
road that Robertson planned to move the men from the two divisions as soon as a
cohesive defense could be created along the Elsenborn Ridge.
That night, east of the Twin Villages, the roads and fields were akin to a scene
from hell. Vehicles and buildings burned brightly, tracers skipped back and
forth, and flares of all colors floated down through the inky darkness while
artillery shells and rockets exploded everywhere. As one officer saw it, "The
night was ablaze with more noise and flame [than he had] thought possible for
men to create."
In the Twin Villages, the tanks that had earlier gotten by McKinley's men roamed
the streets shooting at anything that moved. Near the church they encountered
three Shermans. The ensuing fight was short and one-sided; soon all three
American tanks were smoking hulks. Adding to the bedlam, German artillery
bracketed the villages, setting more buildings afire.
Late on December 17, two events occurred that would have an effect not only on
the raging battle in and around the Twin Villages, but also, later, the defense
of the Elsenborn Ridge itself. First, the 1st Infantry Division's 26th Infantry
Regiment had arrived and taken up positions between Butgenbach and B�llingen.
This took some of the pressure off the few remaining troops of the 99th Division
south and southwest of the Twin Villages. It also strengthened the weak southern
flank and alleviated some of Robertson's concern about a thrust from B�llingen.
Secondly, the remaining men of the 394th's 1st Battalion at M�rringen, as well
as the 23rd's 1st Battalion at H�nningen, gave up their positions. Adhering to
Lauer's orders, both units broke off contact and made their way to the Twin
Villages. In the confusion around Krinkelt, many men became lost and separated,
but the majority of the 394th made it through Krinkelt and Wirtzfeld to
Elsenborn while those of the 23rd made it to Wirtzfeld, where they joined the
9th Infantry in establishing a defense of the village.
Throughout the night, artillery continued to pound the Twin Villages as German
tanks prowled the streets in search of American positions. But more than a few
panzers fell prey to teams of bazooka-firing GIs who stalked and then destroyed
the steel behemoths in the narrow lanes. In several cases when bazooka rockets
ran out, GIs emptied gasoline cans over the often slow-moving tanks and lit them
with thermite grenades. After losing their infantry support, three German tanks
hid in the rubble and played dead, content to wait until daylight before
resuming the attack. Farther east, throughout the night, the Germans funneled
men and armor into the woods in preparation for an all-out assault at dawn.
At 0700, with thick fog and smoke obscuring the battlefield, the Germans sallied
forth again, a heavy barrage of artillery and rockets preceding their advance.
Near Lausdell, McKinley's men, fed and resupplied overnight, prepared to meet
the challenge. They did not have to wait long--soon, hundreds of SS
Panzergrenadiers supported by tanks loomed out of the fog. Letting the first
wave of armor pass, the GIs rose from their foxholes and engaged the enemy
infantry with any weapon at hand--guns, knives, even shovels. "One man tried to
stop a tank by jamming his rifle between the cleats of its track," recalled an
eyewitness. Bazooka teams crept up to the slow-moving armor and knocked out
several, small-arms fire picking off any crewman who tried to escape. Excellent
shooting by American artillery finally broke up the savage attack, but the
determined Germans were not finished. At 0830, after regrouping in the woods,
they came on again in even larger numbers. This time, even with the deadly
artillery fire right on target, the GIs around Lausdell were unable to stem the
German tide. Several tanks broke through followed closely by German infantry,
both headed for the cauldron that was the Twin Villages.
During the night, McKinley had received word that his men would be withdrawn as
soon as the 38th Infantry's 2nd Battalion had established its defense, but the
Germans struck before McKinley's men could pull out. Via radio, McKinley told
Colonel Boos that he could not disengage unless tank or tank destroyer support
could be found. Suddenly, as if on cue, four Shermans appeared at the Baracken
Crossroads. Asked if he wanted to fight, the tank platoon commander yelled
loudly, "Hell, yes!" The Shermans moved in quickly, firing at enemy armor
between the front lines and Rocherath. In quick succession, they accounted for
four knocked out German tanks. The planned withdrawal commenced shortly after
noon with the Shermans providing close support, as American artillery again rose
to the occasion and prevented any interference by the enemy infantry. The last
out of the CP, McKinley and his operations officer ran, heads lowered, towards
the Baracken Crossroads, and as they fled they heard Germans shouting behind
them, demanding their unit's surrender.
Just a little over a day earlier, 600 men had gone into Lausdell; now only 217
came out. The magnificent stand by McKinley and his men was a high point seldom
witnessed in battle. "You have saved my regiment," Boos told him.
In Krinkelt, the men of Mildren's 1st Battalion had been fighting tanks
practically barehanded all morning long. Mildren had tried more than once to
secure assistance from Boos in Rocherath, but to no avail. As the morning wore
on and more panzers appeared, Mildren directed one of his staff to call the CP
again for armored support. In short order, a junior officer was on the radio
talking with Boos. "Sir, we've got to have TDs [tank destroyers]. We're being
overrun by Jerry tanks." Calmly, Boos asked, "How many tanks? And just how close
are they to you?" Just then, one of the German tanks roared by outside Mildren's
CP, shaking the house to its very foundation. The young officer then replied,
"Well, Colonel, if I went up to the second floor, I could piss out the window
and hit at least six."
The savage fighting continued nonstop all day. Infantry and tank battles raged
throughout the villages. The streets and lanes of both were filled with wrecked
and burning tanks. Bodies of American and German dead were strewn about
everywhere, frozen into the grotesque positions that only violent death can
fashion. Men were captured, escaped and were recaptured. For hours GIs and
grenadiers fought one another separated only by a narrow road. Word that the SS
had been murdering prisoners and bayoneting wounded spread like wildfire through
the American ranks and as the battle for Krinkelt and Rocherath continued--they
neither gave nor expected quarter.
Near Mildren's CP in Krinkelt, a Tiger tank was wreaking havoc. Lieutenant Jesse
Morrow, Mildren's communications officer, watched as the 60-ton monster rolled
over a jeep, flattening it. Grabbing a bazooka that had been flung from the
jeep, Morrow aimed at the rear of the tank and fired. The tank rolled on a
little, out of control, then careened into a house. A crewman stuck his head out
of the top hatch, and Morrow fired his .45 at him until it was empty. Just then
a second jeep came toward the young officer. Spotting another bazooka in the
vehicle, he stopped the driver, grabbed the weapon and leaped around the corner,
ready to fire. Then he froze. He was looking directly down the tank's cannon.
The tank's gunner fired, and the concussion from the shell exploding behind him
knocked Morrow unconscious.
Coming to, Morrow saw the tank was a smoking hulk. He crawled back to the CP
where Mildren, who had watched the entire scene unfold, could not believe that
Morrow was still alive--alive, but not unscathed. The 88mm round from the Tiger
had grazed Morrow's neck as it passed, and he was bleeding profusely. Mildren
ordered him evacuated immediately to a field hospital. As he was being loaded
into an ambulance, Morrow noticed three badly burned German prisoners. A medic
told him, "These guys were in the tank that shot you. A GI threw a thermite bomb
down the turret." Smiling at the young American officer, one of the Germans
asked, "Do you have a cigarette? Cigarette?" Morrow tried to get up. But with
his fingers still clawing at the German, he dropped back, unconscious.
The plan for the withdrawal from the Twin Villages had been finalized by early
morning December 19. It was simple: units would be pulled out from left to
right, or from north to south. General Robertson encouraged the officers who
were actually leading men not to use the word "withdrawal." This action was "a
move to new positions," and would be conducted in an orderly fashion. The men
would "walk, not run." About 1330, Colonel Boos ordered all equipment that could
not be carried out of the villages to be destroyed. The Germans, still unwilling
to give up, attacked throughout the day, but not on the scale of previous days.
This was partially due to the fact that the 12th SS Panzer Division had been
ordered to detour south and bypass the bottleneck, and continue on to its final
objective--the banks of the Meuse River.
Commencing at 1730, the 395th RCT fell back from positions around the Baracken
Crossroads, withdrawing along a boggy trail toward Elsenborn. The 38th
Infantry's 2nd Battalion was next, followed by Mildren's 1st Battalion. Soon
thereafter, the majority of American troops were gone, out of the charnel house
that the Twin Villages had become. A rear guard consisting of infantry,
engineers and some tank destroyers held the back door through Wirtzfeld open
until early morning on December 20. Then they too made their way back along the
muddy, deeply rutted road to Elsenborn.
After three long, difficult days of practically nonstop combat (seven days for
most of the 2nd Division), the initial phase of the battle around Elsenborn
Ridge was over. Although some units lost as much as 80 percent of their combat
strength, the back of the German offensive in the Ardennes was effectively
broken at the Twin Villages. The continuing efforts of the 2nd and 99th
divisions, in concert with the 1st Division to the south and the 78th Division
in the north, near Elsenborn Ridge, would end all German hopes for a successful
drive to the Meuse River and then the vital Belgian port of Antwerp."
Note: This info comes from off of the web. Web address is
http://www.thehistorynet.com